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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we look at the supply chain for PPE during the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020. We 
look at the way the supply chain has responded to the pandemic, the coordination of the supply 
chain relative to the needs of primary users, and the consequences of its use. We find that the 
supply chain has continued to function more as a commercial supply chain than as an emergency 
supply chain largely because of a lack of centralized coordination. We include an analysis of 
existing concepts as they apply to this supply chain, but also incorporate preliminary results 




This year, the personal protective equipment industry (PPE) wound up not only in a pandemic, 
but also in a political storm. In ordinary times, competitors have straightforward supply chains. 
For example, N95 masks require only a few raw materials to manufacture: rubber for the strap, 
polypropylene for the mask, and metal or staples to attach the strap to the mask. These materials 
are readily available in the United States and internationally due to the economic contraction 
caused by the pandemic. Other uses for these materials have diminished, so these materials have 
in some ways become more available.(Manfredi, L., 2020, May, 3; O’Brien, J., 2020, March 23). 
 
But these are not ordinary times. While raw materials are available, healthcare professionals 
have faced shortages of PPE, in some cases with probably tragic results. Major firms have 
attempted to adapt to new conditions, but without centralized coordination, these adaptations 
have only been partially successful. The major companies typically use distributors for finished 
products instead of direct shipping to individual customers. 3M, a major competitor in the PPE 
industry, has chosen to move to direct shipping to customers during the pandemic to speed the 
process and cut down on price gouging by distributors (Manfredi, L., 2020, May, 3; O’Brien, J., 
2020, March 23). 
 
Given these circumstances, several questions arise. What is the nature of the disruption to the 
PPE supply chain? What can be done to avoid such disruptions in the future? What plans might 
improve the effectiveness of such supply chains for future crises? The supply chain in most 
industries have been disrupted during the current pandemic, but few have been more visible than 
the PPE. It is important to analyze what has worked well and where companies could improve 
during this pandemic and in potential future pandemics. It also becomes important to sort out the 
political from the practical. 
 
Another issue is the difference between commercial supply chains and humanitarian supply 
chains. Related to that is the issue of slow-moving versus fast-moving disasters and the supply 
chains appropriate to them. We will not attempt in this paper to deal with all of them, but touch 
on key issues related to them, using the PPE industry as an example. We should also point out 
that we have used qualitative data in our results, but data collection is on-going, so any 
conclusions that we draw must be considered preliminary. 
 
This paper is arranged into three sections. The first section is a literature review on supply chains 
in general and on the ideas expressed in the literature apply to the PPE supply chain. It includes 
brief discussions of the article, its application to PPE, and some interview results from an 
ongoing study. The interview results are presented anonymously at this time because the data 
have not been fully analyzed. The second section discusses more broadly how theories in supply 
chain management and the preliminary study results apply to the PPE industry. The third section 




In some regards, this literature review is a review of supply chain literature reviews. It touches 
on the literature in purchasing, inventory control, warehouse location, supply chain network 
design, transportation, and warehouse operations. We start with purchasing. 
 
Purchasing, Logistics, and the PPE Supply Chain 
 
Fabbe-Costes & Nollet (2015) showed how logistics and purchasing are interdependent 
departments, and how treating them as such benefits the company. Through a literature review 
and comparison, they discuss how seeing them as interdependent improves the management of 
the supply chain. This collaboration, commonly known as supply chain integration, starts as an 
internal process and then is extended to external processes. Although these are closely related 
functions, the authors found that little research had been done regarding the internal integration 
of the departments (Fabbe-Costes & Nollet, 2015). 
 
Fabbe-Costes & Nollet (2015) examined two organizational functions in their research, logistics 
and purchasing. They reviewed the historical growth of each field, seeking four things: 1) the 
strategic objective of the function; 2) how the function was viewed by management; 3) which 
aspect of managing the function fulfilled: and 4) how much of the function was outsourced.. 
They found that logistics evolved from simply controlling costs in the 1970s to resiliency and 
sustainability most recently. 
 
Purchasing evolved in the same period from supporting management to contributing strategically 
or being outsourced.They attribute the rapid growth in logistics to computing power that has 
allowed for advanced modeling. They concluded that the two departments need to collaborate 
and communicate to improve supply chain management overall. 
 
Discussion and Results 
 
For PPE in this crisis, the integration of these two functions was intriguing. First, the crisis put 
purchasing functions in firms from outside the PPE supply chain in the position of attempting to 
purchase PPE or related materials.One of our interview subjects, for example, described the 
purchasing and logistics problem for a meat processing plant. Meat processing plants needed to 
buy protective equipment of a nature and quantity that they did not understand. These were 
experienced purchasing professionals, but they were in no position to understand how and when 
to source PPE, how to judge its quality, or how to store it. 
According to this interview source, a large meat processing plant faced exactly this problem. 
They were offered a wide variety of masks and other PPE, but had no way of evaluating the 
supplier, the quality of the product, or the appropriateness of the product for their needs. 
Furthermore, they were being offered masks and gloves in quantities that belied storage--some 
would be suppliers were offering disposable masks in quantities of billions. This meant 
coordinating with logistics to determine what was doable. 
 
As it happened, the supplier making such an offer was illegitimate, someone who had no access 
to such quantities, but such fake suppliers slipped in opportunistically and caused much 
confusion in this market. Fortunately, in the case of this meat packer, they sought help from an 
expert in PPE who was able to sort the problem out for them, at least to some extent. Of course, 
this did not involve the supply chain for standard, medical PPE. 
 
Inventory Control and the PPE Supply Chain 
 
Jackson, Tolujevs, and Kegenbekov (2020) studied past and current inventory control models. 
They started by differentiating between analytical and non-analytical approaches to inventory 
control. They included analytic models from as far back as 1888. The analytic model, the EOQ, 
is particularly suited to a single product that is robust to violations of specific assumptions. Since 
many products today will not fit these assumptions, this model has major drawbacks, although it 
remains in use in many computer systems. 
 
They examined non-analytic models that included control theory, dynamic programming, 
simulation optimization, and metamodeling. Control theory uses differential equations to create a 
model that more closely mirrors real-world conditions. This theory also works best with a single 
product. The dynamic programming approach can be used with multiple products in a stochastic 
environment. Simply put, approximations are made to come to an optimal model for inventory 
control. Simulation-based optimization is conducted by algorithms that attempt to create optimal 
solutions based on inputs. The metamodel, or model of models (Jackson, Tolujevs, & 
Kegenbekov, 2020), utilizes models that have worked satisfactorily in other simulations. 
 
Discussion and Results 
Many of these models struggle to meet the conditions produced by a pandemic. While some are 
dynamic and adaptive, the variations fall outside the range of tolerable variation for the models. 
Not only that, but the existence of false offerings and shifting orders mean that the models work 
well for the information they have, but that information is often wrong. PPE orders were delayed. 
Shipments were shifted to other destinations without notice. Information on availability was 
incorrect. Prices fluctuated in unpredictable ways, but primarily went up. This kind of 
information disruption damages the ability of models to function and to provide good 
information for decision making. 
 
Many of the difficulties in managing PPE inventory in these circumstances arose because the 
models work well when information is sound. One of our informants told us about receiving 
orders from six different representatives of one state for the same shipment of PPE. The state 
was effectively competing with itself for the goods, not to mention other states and the federal 
government. Inventory rarely sat in the distribution centers or warehouses in the early days of 
this process, so much of the inventory was in transit. The PPE manufacturers experienced little 
of the inventory carrying costs, however, because payment was often in advance. The value of 
the inventory changed in two ways. First, the cost rose for additional capacity that was less suited 
for the manufacture and prices of raw materials rose. Second, the prices for PPE rose as the 
perceived shortage pushed buyers to raise their bids. 
Transportation and the PPE Supply Chain 
 
Transportation mode and carrier choice continue to be the most important transportation 
decisions a supply chain manager makes. Meixell & Norbis (2008) industry challenges such as 
capacity shortfalls, changing fuel prices, capacity shortages, environmental issues, international 
growth, and security concerns. Their discussion was based on an extensive literature review 
(Meixell & Norbis, 2008). They considered only the literature published after deregulation in 
1980. 
 
They found that carrier choice decisions were based on three main characteristics: carrier 
attributes; shipper decision processes; and integration of shipper and carrier into the shipper’s 
supply chain. They also found that most shippers consider customer service more important than 
costs, but costs rated second. If shippers seek long-term relationships with carriers, then they 
tend to stress to the carrier the attributes that they seek, usually details related to service levels. 
These details will vary by customer. Four general models summarized the shipper decision 
making processes: an economic model,an inventory-theoretic model, a trade-off model, and an 
optimization model (Meixell & Norbis, 2008). Integration covered matters like which ports a 
carrier served, shipment size, segments in the transport chain, and warehousing throughout the 
transportation chain. 
The authors list six significant findings from the literature review: 1) Attributes of the carrier are 
important to the customer; 2) Choosing the carrier and mode are “multi-attribute” (p. 202) 
problems; 3) Changes in regulation and the market have changed the attributes that are important 
to customers; 4) capacity of the carriers and the industries has been well covered in research: 5) 
surveys and mathematical modelling is widely used in choosing carriers and modes of 
transportation; and 6) supply chain integration has allowed customers more flexibility and 
shipping options. 
Gorman, et al. (2014) investigated the ways modes of transportation used operations research 
(OR) and management science (MS) to improve the efficiency and lower the costs of moving 
goods. Freight transportation is a large part of the world economy (over 3% US GDP) . Because 
freight “transportation is asset, labor, and fuel intensive” (Gorman & et al., 2014, p. 535), 
managing the costs involved becomes more complex as the network grows. 
Gorman, et al. (2014) looked at six freight operations: ocean, air, rail, truck, truck-rail 
intermodal, and package delivery. They discussed five areas of interest in each operation; 
network design and management, mobile asset planning and management, terminal management, 
load management, and unique areas of research. 
 
Carriers must consider two main factors when developing networks, designing the network with 
appropriate routes and scheduling efficiently. The authors point out that speed of freight 
transportation isn’t always the most efficient since going faster requires more fuel (Gorman, et 
al., 2014). Carriers must balance the design of the fleet between fleet size and type of vehicle. 
Managing mobile assets (vehicles) and the terminals (vehicles, freight, labor) efficiently can 
have immediate effects on the cost of moving freight. Returning empty vehicles from one port 
drives costs higher with no corresponding income. Managing loads can make or break a 
transportation operation. 
 
Some areas suggested for research are using game theory to model pooling fleets to increase 
flexibility, using OR modeling to help rail companies manage congestion and capacity, using OR 
modeling to help less-than-truckload (LTL) carriers manage uncertainty, and using similar 
pricing processes for freight as airlines use for passengers. The authors conclude that scheduling 
is one area in need of research in any transportation mode. Since all of the transportation modes 
have more information than ever before, OR modeling can assist with turning that information 
into knowledge. 
 
Discussion and Results 
 
Since supply chains were often disrupted for PPE, it’s no surprise that transportation experienced 
some disruptions like rerouting, but such disruptions in transportation and transportation decision 
making were relatively few. Truck driver turnover remained much higher than in the Great 
Recession when it fell to 39%. In the pandemic, the turnover rate rarely fell below 80% and has 
returned to near 100% as of this writing. This suggests the skewed nature of the economic effects 
of the pandemic to date. A majority of Americans still have enough income to keep buying and 
to draw trucks into service. Driver turnover remains a capacity issue, but most trucking firms 
have operated without buying new trucks during this period. 
 
Some of the trucking capacity has turned to the delivery of PPE, but still more of that capacity 
continues to operate in routes that serve their traditional customers. For example, dedicated auto 
haulers are operating at 80% of their normal capacity. 
 
Since all modes of transportation have been used at some point in PPE supply chains, all of the 
techniques discussed could be used in this situation. It again depends on the accuracy of the 
information that goes into the models and how the models inform decisions. 
 
For example, one of our interview subjects was directly involved in shipping PPE and medical 
equipment by air from the US to China in early February. When this became public knowledge, 
it created some controversy. The shipment and its arrangements were attributed to President 
Donald Trump and the White House in political ads, but that attribution was debunked by the 
Washington Post fact checking operation. That operation found that President Trump and the 
White House had nothing to do with arranging or authorizing the shipment (Kessler, April 22, 
2020). The shipment was arranged by Project Hope, a charity that had worked in Wuhan for 
more than 25 years. The people who arranged and delivered the shipment had no idea that any 
controversy would be involved. 
Network Design and the PPE Supply Chain 
 
Onstein, Tavasszy, and van Damme (2019) reviewed the literature on the design of 
transportation and distribution networks in a global context. Several designs have prevailed for 
decades: direct from the manufacturer to the store or consumer; through multiple layers of 
distributors in multiple countries, including domestic and international distribution; and hybrids 
of the two. Cross-docking also aids international distribution. 
 
Good logistics networks address four main purposes: meeting customer service needs, reducing 
logistics costs, adapting to rapid changes in material needs, and making informed financial 
decisions. Onstein, Tavasszy, & van Damme (2019) found little research describing the factors 
that companies use to determine optimal logistics models. The literature in their review fell into 
three main categories: supply chain management, transportation, and geography. 
 
When managers used a supply chain management perspective to choose locations for distribution 
centers, they tended to focus on demand characteristics, logistics service levels and costs, and 
product characteristics. When they used a transportation perspective, they concentrated on 
optimization models with the goal of reducing logistics costs. When they took the geographic 
perspective, they focused on accessibility, land and labor costs, and contextual factors including 
taxes and labor laws (Onstein, Tavasszy, & van Damme, 2019). 
 
This research found that while many factors are considered in choosing locations in 
transportation networks, little research links these factors to how companies ultimately determine 
locations. They suggest studying the relationship among factors and decisions, determining a 
way to integrate factors from different approaches to research, and investigating “logistics 
sprawl” (Onstein, Tavasszy, & van Damme, 2019, p. 257). 
 
Discussion and Results 
For PPE, the networks function well in ordinary times. They adapted poorly to the initial surge in 
demand for additional PPE, to the detriment of healthcare workers in the first U.S. hotspots like 
New York and New Jersey. This was not the fault of the routine, existing supply chains for PPE. 
Rather, it was a consequence of chaotic responses from government entities, including states and 
the federal government. The network was there, but the supply was not directed toward the 
points of need. The manufacturers had adequate networks, but no sense of direction and no 
access to abundant global supply. 
 
In our interviews, one informant said flatly that globally there was never a shortage of PPE. Not 
only were the materials available, they were abundant. At one point, as a supplier of PPE, she 
received six orders from agents representing one state, but all six were for the same supply 
requirement. This clearly had nothing to with the PPE network operated by manufacturers like 
3M. So network design was not at fault. Rather, it was directing supply to the network. 
 
Warehousing and the PPE Supply Chain 
 
It is not sufficient to simply place a PPE distribution center. Rather, it must also be operated. One 
of the most important operations in a warehouse is order picking. Altarazi & Ammouri (2018) 
simulated ways to order pick manually. Since manual order picking requires careful planning to 
protect supplier and customer relations, the plan must be well thought out and attainable. The 
results of the simulations show layouts and warehouse sizes that are mostly likely to work best. 
While manual order picking is common in warehousing, it is also labor intensive. Human 
interaction is required at every step from receiving the merchandise to picking merchandise and 
shipping it out. Warehouse designs typically start with analytical methods that follow the process 
sequence in the warehouse. Policies are often determined after these details have been 
determined (Altarazi & Ammouri, 2018). Simulations allow for policies to be set first, followed 
by laying out detailed processes. 
 
In the past, researchers have used discrete event simulation and agent-based modeling, usually to 
study five common operational policies: strict order, batch, sequential zone, concurrent zone, and 
wave picking (Altarazi & Ammouri, 2018), all patterns for picking merchandise. The studies 
then considered how to minimize distance traveled by machines and staff and ways to maximize 
the utilization of equipment. 
 
In their simulations, the authors examined five main warehousing design decisions: throughput, 
size, layout, operational policies, number of carts, and number of staff (Altarazi & Ammouri, 
2018). They began the simulation with some defined independent variables like a rectangular 
warehouse and statistical data for certain warehousing functions such as receiving time, 
unloading time, and shipping times. They studied different layouts to determine the most 
effective layout and policies. 
 
They used ARENA, a simulation software, to develop modules that worked together to form the 
larger simulation. The first part of the simulation described the incoming freight process that 
included receiving, unloading, and stocking shelves. The second part of the simulation measured 
the outgoing freight processes. Statistical data was developed using ANOVA and Tukey’s 
multi-comparison tests. They used sensitivity analysis on the number and types of products 
(SKUs). 
 
Ultimately, Altarazi & Ammouri (2018) suggest several areas for research based on the 
following results: 1) horizontal layouts are preferred to other layouts; 2) small warehouses are 
preferable, but larger warehouses can be broken down into smaller segments; 3) adding an aisle 
to the rectangular layout adds efficiency as opposed to changing the layout; 4) high throughput is 
more efficient in small warehouses; and 5) compromises must be made between the number of 
SKUs in a warehouse and the time it takes to handle each SKU. 
 
Discussion and Results 
 
Warehouses for PPE suffered from both shortages and backups during the early days of the 
pandemic. Like other businesses, they had employees who were out sick, stayed away for safety, 
or were laid off. The legitimate sellers of PPE continued to operate in much the fashion they had 
before the crisis, but with more production capacity dedicated to PPE when it was possible. They 
may have been slow to respond because they lacked clear direction. This is one of the areas 
where the commercial supply chain differed from the humanitarian supply chain. In effect, 
someone needs to direct a commercial supply chain to become part of an humanitarian supply 
chain when that is not a normal part of business. 
 
Warehouse operations change little in terms of processes. They were too busy to make major 
changes. Also, their operations remained largely normal because they were never called into the 
humanitarian supply chain. The allocation of inventory followed the ordinary processes of going 
to those who paid for them and directed their course. This included most states individually, the 
federal government, hospital and other medical systems, and large companies who were still 
feeling their way through the purchasing processes. 
Our interview subjects discussed having to change operations in their warehouses to 
accommodate customers whose businesses were growing--like PPE producers--and to vacate 
space allocated to those with declining businesses. The pandemic was determinate. 
 
Customer Service and PPE Supply Chains 
 
In rapid-onset emergencies like hurricanes, cost considerations in customer service are often 
abandoned in favor of service. In the pandemic, customer service seemed to take on both a 
short-term and a slow-developing humanitarian caste, as well as some business as usual. Naoui 
(2014) used qualitative analysis to present an integrated approach to customer service 
performance and management. He found that as customer behavior changed globally, the costs 
of fast delivery needed to be controlled. Other aspects of the supply chain need to be considered 
in developing customer service procedures. Some items to consider are accurate, timely 
deliveries, flexibility, responsiveness, and relationship (Naoui, 2014). Customer service is 
broken down into pre-transactional, transactional, and post-transaction elements such as 
customer service policies, out-of-stock levels, and guarantee/repair, respectively. 
 
Utilizing a case study of Alpha, a telecommunications enterprise, Naoui (2014) interviewed 
employees that had direct contact with customers to determine how employees feel they are 
doing with customers. Questions included ideas about what supply chain management is, how 
does customer service fit into the supply chain, how is your customer service, and the roles of 
several systems within the supply chain (IT, expertise, etc.). Naoui (2014) was able to build a 
framework for customer service within Alpha that could be used to conduct further, in-depth 
research about customer service in supply chain management. 
 
All aspects of daily life have been affected by rapidly changing information and communication 
technology (ICT) (Zhou & Piramuthu, 2012). These changes have benefits and pitfalls that may 
not always be anticipated. The problem of ethics is compounded by the fact that technology can 
be utilized to conduct immoral or illegal activity with less chance of being caught. The authors 
begin with a literature review about business ethics and new technologies and then investigate 
ways in which RFID technology has benefited supply chain management and the dangers of 
using the technology. 
 
Discussion and Results 
 
Customer service has obviously been less than perfect for PPE in the pandemic. Shortages matter 
locally, not globally. Our informants tell us that the supply is available globally, but individual 
healthcare workers in the U.S. have done without PPE, worked with makeshift PPE, or used the 
same PPE for far longer than designed. Multiple sources report fatalities among healthcare 
workers that might be associated with a lack of PPE or lack of adequate PPE. 
Still, the routine supply chains operated in routine fashion, just as many other supply chains did. 
These supply chains suffered no more disruption than others in terms of illness among workers 
or supply disruptions. They may even have escaped with fewer such disruptions. 
 
ETHICS AND PPE SUPPLY CHAINS 
 
Zhou & Piramanthu (2012) integrate the study of ethics with the choice of technologies and 
regulations that a company should develop. By deciding ahead of time how customer and 
business partner information will be handled within the company and possibly outside the 
company, a company can provide assurances to other companies that the information will be safe 
or reveal that the information will be shared. 
 
When deciding if a technology meets the ethical standards of a company, several things must be 
considered such as company values, customer expectations, legislation, and cultural and social 
values. Ultimately, the social consequence of technology should be considered. RFID tags were 
seen as a tool to track shipments and verify that the product was handled within certain 
parameters (temperature, tipping over, etc.), but it was found that competitors could potentially 
“listen” to the RFID tags to learn about the supply chain of its competitors. 
 
Zhou & Piramanthu (2012) use a matrix referred to as the Technology Regulation Development 
(TRD). The matrix lists all considerations to analyze before choosing a new technology. It 
guides ethical decision making as it clearly outlines expectations of the company and outcomes 
that benefit the company. Utilizing the TRD matrix, the authors argue that the benefits of using 
RFID tags do not outweigh the potential harm they could cause. 
 
Discussion and Results 
 
The technology decision tells only part of the ethical circumstances of PPE supply chains in the 
pandemic, but it does provide a starting point. Tracking and tracing are important to making sure 
that an adequate supply reaches the chosen destination in the right condition, for example. But the 
disruptions in the supply chain and the potential for national as well as local ‘selfish’ behavior put 
ethical considerations at the forefront of this crisis. Who should get PPE? Who should get it first? 
Where should it be made? What suppliers are available? All of these questions arose early in the 
crisis, though based on our contacts and interviews, the shortage was more perceived than real and 
remains so. 
 
It is clearly unethical for faux suppliers to attempt to collect deposits on non-existent stock and 
dysfunctional if not unethical for government entities to dispatch multiple agents in pursuit of the 
same order. The ethical circumstances surrounding PPE, both conventional and ad hoc, will 
become clearer with time. At the moment, the preliminary results in the US seem disappointing. 
 
HUMANITARIAN AND COMMERCIAL PPE SUPPLY CHAINS 
 
According to the literature, humanitarian disasters have three attributes that influence the design of 
response supply chains: 1) occurrence in time and space; 2) system disruption; and 3) 
overwhelmed capabilities (Mackay, Munoz, & Pepper, 2019). The dimensions that affect 
humanitarian supply chain design are the time horizon, spatial concentration, affected population 
needs, perceived probability of occurrence, and perceived probability of consequence (Mackay, 
Munoz, and Pepper, 2019). The key distinction between commercial and humanitarian supply 
chains remains the profit motive. 
 
In supply chain research, we have seen that service often outweighs cost, but this is magnified in 
the face of disasters. Reach the people who need the goods and services; ignore the costs to the 
extent possible. This was apparent in the private sector response to Hurricane Katrina. Southern 
Companies put getting the electric grid turned back on above the cost of doing so, bringing the grid 
back up for most people in less than ten days. 
 
Still, humanitarian disasters of all types challenge supply chains and especially supply chain 
design. Even stable humanitarian supply chains sometime defy modeling, although modeling has 
been shown to be useful in most circumstances (Blecken, Hellingrath, Dangelmaier, & Schultz, 
2009) 
 
Discussion and Results 
 
As is often the case, the COVID-19 pandemic response has been confused and confusing. Disasters 
often are unexpected, although not necessarily unanticipated. Countries can prepare for them even 
when they do not know when they will arrive. Private firms have adapted in many ways to the 
pandemic. Manufacturers of toilet paper shifted parts of their supply chains from commercial 
institutional products to commercial home products, for example. 
 
The response in the PPE supply chain has been mixed in the U.S. In one instance, a manufacturer of 
hospital masks contacted the federal government about raising production levels. He was ignored, 
so he maintained production at 600,000 units a week, although his capacity would allow for up to 3 
million units. There remains a shortage of N95 masks based on a recent survey of 21,500 nurses 
and healthcare workers (Anderson, 9/23/2020). 
 
According to the Washington Post, N95 masks are still in shortage for six reasons: 
1. The government hasn't used the Defense Production Act on N95 masks the same way it did on 
ventilators. Instead, it allowed manufacturers to scale up as they saw fit and didn't fund potential 
new manufacturers. 
 
2. Many hospitals cut costs by using medical supply companies to provide equipment on an as-needed 
basis rather than creating a stockpile of personal protective equipment, as they knew that the 
government had the strategic national stockpile filled with PPE it could rely on. But the H1N1 flu 
epidemic in 2009 depleted 85 million N95s from the stockpile, and the supply was never 
replenished. 
 
3. HHS funded the invention of a machine that could make 1.5 million N95 masks per day, but when 
the design was completed in 2018, the government didn't purchase it. 
 
4. HHS turned down an offer in January from a manufacturer that could have made millions of N95 
masks. The agency didn't start ordering the masks from multiple companies until March 21, when 
the U.S. had 8,000 reported COVID-19 cases, and healthcare workers were already worried about 
PPE shortages. 
 
5. Without long-term guarantees that the government will keep buying respirators, N95 manufacturers 
are wary of investing too much to boost production. 
 
"It is not profitable to make respirators in the United States," Peter Tsai, a scientist who invented a 
method to charge the fibers inside the N95 mask's filter, told the Post. 
 
6. U.S. N95 makers have protected their processes as intellectual property, declining to share 
information with other companies that could start making the masks, too.” (Anderson, 2020, p.1) 
 
Ethics probably suggest that political considerations should never come into play during a 
pandemic, but that’s not what has happened. For the most part, the PPE producers have stayed out 





PPE supply chains became the source of political controversy at times, but most of that has 
settled down. The controversy around the 17 ton shipment to Wuhan has faded, having been 
awarded two Pinocchios by Washington Post fact-checkers (Kesslert, 2020). While the lack of 
centralized coordination was certainly a problem, not just because of its absence at that time, but 
also because states were not warned that the disaster response would be their responsibility, the 
claim noted here was falsely attributed to the President. 
 
This reflects the politicization of issues related to the pandemic and to the responses to it. The 
traditional PPE supply chain suffered from some disorganization and some issues, particularly in 
trying to determine its role as either a commercial or a humanitarian supply chain. The crisis also 
spawned a related cottage industry for face coverings, face coverings that do not meet medical 
standards and emphatically do not meet N95 standards. However, these masks have also come to 
symbolize a political divide in the U.S. These have nothing to with the existing supply chains for 
PPE, but they have arisen beside it. 
The functions of logistics and purchasing are significant in the current pandemic for all PPE. 
Companies manufacturing and distributing PPE must understand where the products are needed, 
how many are needed, and how to distribute them in a way that helps the most people. The 
United States was unable to buy the product from American companies initially, but after 
considerable bad press, they began selling to the US government and hospitals within the US. 
These companies had to balance purchasing and logistics with profit and how the public viewed 
them. The Anderson (2020) article describes the industry situation. 
Where PPE is concerned, 2020 has proven that inventory needs can be unpredictable. It is likely 
that the simulation-based optimization model would have worked well pre-pandemic when 
demand was stable. Post-pandemic pandemic models will have to account for the movement of 
demand as the pandemic shifts around the country and the world. The dynamic programming 
model has been shown to work well with the irregularities like those seen with the pandemic. 
However, the models will likely need to change as the pandemic subsides. 
 
PPE carrier and mode choices were likely much simpler before February 2020. Once COVID-19 
struck, the need for PPE throughout the world changed the landscape for moving PPE. Any 
company looking to ship COVID-19 supplies likely will receive assistance within the United 
States with the federal government being a customer and distributor. That this became somewhat 
confused and distorted is problematic. It requires further study. PPE companies must currently 
decide on carriers and modes of transportation based on rate and shipping times with less 
emphasis on other attributes such as environmental effects or security concerns. A question 
remains about the urgency of such shipments, as well as precisely where they need to go. 
 
3M, like any other PPE producer, must consider all the items discussed here. Since 3M already 
has a seemingly well-designed logistics network, it has been able to deliver the product to its 
distributors effectively. Had there not been an effective network already in place, 3M would have 
to adapt to the pandemic and adjust the network to include additional outside storage and/or 
transportation to and from the additional centers. 3M did begin to distribute masks directly to 
medical facilities and governmental agencies, eliminating the distribution centers. All 
manufacturers of PPE must consider the needs of the population in the US and internationally 
which will affect any decision about distribution centers. 
 
Because of the high throughput that personal protective equipment manufacturers are trying to 
accommodate, creating a simulation to streamline manufacturing processes should be considered. 
The fastest-moving SKUs should be moved closest to the receiving and freight areas to save time 
by minimizing travel time and staff time. If the manufacturers already have simulation models in 
place, they can use them to rethink the layout of the warehouse and placement of freight. If they 
do not already have a simulation model built, it would probably be in their best interest to begin 
developing a model for future use. The needs of the world can change overnight as we have seen 
with COVID, and these companies must be able to adapt with little warning. 
 
This article applies in many ways to the PPE field. Since PPE is in such high demand, 
manufacturers, distributors, and customers must make a trade-off between speed and cost. Ocean 
travel is not a feasible option for the items most needed such as masks and gowns but could still 
be used for large shipments of other types of PPE. Air, rail, and truck seem to be the best option 
for shipping at this point. This type of network design should already be in place for 
emergencies. 3M did have a plan in place to distribute the products, but it simply could not keep 
up with demand. Having a good relationship with specific carriers before an emergency can lead 
to priority treatment during an emergency. 
Companies in the PPE field need to consider how their customer service departments are reacting 
to the pandemic. Long term customers will likely expect better service than new customers, but it 
is imperative to provide good customer service to new customers also. Retaining customers will 
be important once the pandemic is over since sales will likely drop precipitously, not necessarily 
to pre-pandemic levels, however. Flexibility and responsiveness are likely the two most 
important factors that PPE companies will have to consider while there is uncertainty in the PPE 
market. 
The PPE industry has faced some ethical issues during the pandemic. To fulfill orders, the 
companies were shipping masks where COVID-19 was most prevalent, but that was outside the 
US and created a backlash. When the companies began shipping only within North America, the 
public was pacified, but at what cost? It has been shown that there were more masks available to 
the US, but companies were unsure how to distribute them effectively. 3M, specifically, ramped 
up production to 24 hours a day and are producing as much as they can and began direct 
distribution to hospitals and medical facilities (instead of distributors), but there is still the public 
opinion that there is a shortage of supplies. 3M had a pandemic plan in place and reacted 
quickly, but it is hard to know if there was more that could have been done with any new 
technology. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND CALL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
We have come to several tentative conclusions based on preliminary research results here. First, 
centralized coordination of the pandemic response was absent, so PPE supply chains responded 
as commercial supply chains, acting on the information that was available. Second, PPE 
producers and distributors were overwhelmed by demand in the early stages of the pandemic, but 
responded in a way that was definite by the market and government requirements. Third, the PPE 
supply chain was prepared for this pandemic to about the same degree as other commercial 
supply chains, which is to say not at all. 
 
As we stated from the outset, these results and conclusions are preliminary and tentative. They 
leave open a broad range of questions for future research. These include: Does a pandemic require 
central coordination in the US or can states, given sufficient notice, prepare and respond 
individually? Should the US and other countries maintain a strategic stock of PPE and other 
supplies in anticipation of another pandemic? If so, how should that stock be handled to deal with 
inventory aging, warehouse location, network design, transportation, and priority setting? 
 
More broadly, what can governments and private firms at all levels do to respond more rapidly and 
effectively to pandemics and other disasters? This is hardly a new question. Whole journals on 
humanitarian supply chains examine questions related to this. And finally, what lessons can PPE 
and other supply chains take from the events of 2020-21? 
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